We investigate the efficiency of fair allocations of indivisible goods using the well-studied price of fairness concept. Previous work has focused on classical fairness notions such as envy-freeness, proportionality, and equitability. However, these notions cannot always be satisfied for indivisible goods, leading to certain instances being ignored in the analysis. In this paper, we focus instead on notions with guaranteed existence, including envyfreeness up to one good (EF1), balancedness, maximum Nash welfare (MNW), and leximin. We mostly provide tight or asymptotically tight bounds on the worst-case efficiency loss for allocations satisfying these notions.
Introduction
The allocation of scarce resources among interested agents is a problem that arises frequently and plays a major role in our society. We often want to ensure that the allocation that we select is fair to the agents-the literature of fair division, which dates back to the design of cakecutting algorithms over half a century ago [Steinhaus, 1948; Dubins and Spanier, 1961] , provides several ways of defining what fair means. An issue orthogonal to fairness is efficiency, or social welfare, which refers to the total happiness of the agents. A fundamental question is therefore how much efficiency we might lose if we want our allocation to be fair.
This question was first addressed by Caragiannis et al. [2012] , who introduced the price of fairness concept to capture the efficiency loss due to fairness constraints. For any fairness notion and any given resource allocation instance with additive valuations, they defined the price of fairness of the instance to be the ratio between the maximum social welfare over all allocations and the maximum social welfare over allocations that are fair according to the notion. The overall price of fairness for this notion is then defined as the largest price of fairness across all instances. Caragiannis et al. considered the classical fairness notions of envy-freeness, proportionality and equitability, and presented a series of results on the price of fairness with respect to these notions. As an example, they showed that for the allocation of indivisible goods among n agents, the price of proportionality is n − 1 + 1/n, meaning that the efficiency of the best proportional allocation can be a linear factor away from that of the best allocation overall.
Caragiannis et al.'s work sheds light on the trade-off between efficiency and fairness in the allocation of both divisible and indivisible resources. However, a significant limitation of their study is that while an allocation satisfying each of the three fairness notions always exists when goods are divisible, this is not the case for indivisible goods. Indeed, none of the notions can be satisfied in the simple instance with at least two agents and a single good to be allocated. Caragiannis et al. circumvented this issue by ignoring instances in which the fairness notion in question cannot be satisfied. As a result, their price of fairness analysis, which is meant to capture the worst-case efficiency loss, fails to cover certain scenarios that may arise in practice. 1 In addition, the fact that certain instances are not taken into account in the price of fairness have seemingly contradictory consequences. For example, since envy-free allocations are always proportional when valuations are additive, it may appear at first glance that the price of envy-freeness must be at least as high as the price of proportionality. This is not necessarily the case, however, because there are instances that admit proportional but no envyfree allocations. 2 To address these limitations, in this paper we study the price of fairness for indivisible goods with respect to fairness notions that can be satisfied in every instance. Among other notions, we consider envy-freeness up to one good (EF1), balancedness, maximum Nash welfare (MNW), and leximin. 3 In addition to deriving bounds on the price of fairness for these notions, we also introduce the concept of strong price of fairness, which captures the efficiency loss in the worst fair allocation as opposed to that in the best fair allocation. The relationship between the price of fairness and the strong price 1 From the above example, one may think that such scenarios are rare exceptions. However, for envy-freeness, these scenarios are in fact common if the number of goods is not too large compared to the number of agents [Dickerson et al., 2014; Manurangsi and Suksompong, 2019] .
2 Indeed, the instance that Caragiannis et al. used to show that the price of proportionality is at least n − 1 + 1/n admits no envy-free allocation. Thus, it is still possible that the price of envy-freeness is lower than the price of proportionality.
3 See Section 2 for the definitions of these notions.
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Balancedness (BAL)
Θ( √ n) 4/3 ∞ ∞ Maximum Nash welfare (MNW) Θ(n) LB: 27/23 UB: 5/4 Θ(n) LB: 27/23 UB: 5/4 Maximum egalitarian welfare (MEW) Θ(n) 3/2 ∞ for n ≥ 3 3/2 Leximin (LEX) Θ(n) 3/2 Θ(n) 3/2 Pareto optimality (PO) 1 1 Θ(n 2 ) 3 Table 1 : Summary of our results. LB denotes lower bound and UB denotes upper bound. We do not consider the (strong) price of EFX for n > 2 because it is not known whether an EFX allocation always exists. If we allow dependence on the number of goods m, we have an upper bound of O( √ n log(mn)) on the price of EF1.
of fairness is akin to that between the price of stability and the price of anarchy for equilibria. While the strong price of fairness is too demanding to yield any nontrivial guarantee for some fairness notions, as we will see, it does provide meaningful guarantees for other notions.
Our Results
The majority of our results can be found in Table 1 ; we highlight a subset of these next. For the price of EF1, we provide a lower bound of Ω( √ n) and an upper bound of O(n). We then show that two common ways to obtain an EF1 allocationthe round-robin algorithm and MNW-have a price of fairness of linear order (for round-robin the price is exactly n), implying that these methods cannot be used to improve the upper bound for EF1. We also show that improving this upper bound would yield a corresponding improvement on the price of envy-freeness gap for divisible goods left open by Caragiannis et al. [2012] . On the other hand, if we allow dependence on the number of goods m, the price of EF1 is O( √ n log(mn))-this means that the Ω( √ n) lower bound is almost tight unless the number of goods is huge compared to the number of agents. For MNW, maximum egalitarian welfare (MEW), and leximin, we prove an asymptotically tight bound of Θ(n) on the price of fairness. Moreover, with the exception of EF1 and MNW, we establish exactly tight bounds in the case of two agents for all fairness notions.
On the strong price of fairness front, we show via a simple instance that the strong price of EF1 and balancedness are infinite, meaning that there are arbitrarily bad EF1 and balanced allocations. Nevertheless, a round-robin allocation, which satisfies these two properties, always has welfare within a factor n 2 of the optimal allocation, and this factor is exactly tight. For MNW and leximin, the strong price of fairness, like the price of fairness, is of linear order. However, while the price of MEW is also Θ(n), the strong price of MEW is infinite for n ≥ 3 (and 3/2 for n = 2). Finally, we consider Pareto optimality, for which the price of fairness is trivially 1. We show that the strong price of Pareto optimality is Θ(n 2 ).
Related Work
The price of fairness was introduced independently by Bertsimas et al. [2011] and Caragiannis et al. [2012] . Bertsimas et al. studied the concept for divisible goods with respect to fairness notions such as proportional fairness and max-min fairness. Caragiannis et al. presented a number of bounds for both goods and chores (i.e., items that yield negative utility), both when these items are divisible and indivisible. The price of fairness has subsequently been examined in several other settings, including for contiguous allocations of divisible goods [Aumann and Dombb, 2015] , indivisible goods [Suksompong, 2019] , and divisible chores [Heydrich and van Stee, 2015] , as well as in the context of machine scheduling [Bilò et al., 2016] . Typically, the price of fairness study focuses on quantifying the efficiency loss solely in terms of the number of agents. A notable exception to this is the work of Kurz [2014] , who remarked that certain constructions used to establish worstcase bounds for indivisible goods require a large number of goods. As a result, Kurz investigated the dependence of the price of fairness on both the number of agents and the number of goods, and found that the price indeed improves significantly if we limit the number of goods.
Preliminaries
Denote by N = {1, 2, . . . , n} the set of agents and M = {1, 2, . . . , m} the set of goods. Each agent i has a nonnegative utility u i (j) for each good j. The agents' utilities are additive, meaning that u i (M ′ ) = j∈M ′ u i (j) for every agent i and subset of goods M ′ ⊆ M . Following Caragiannis et al. [2012] , we normalize the utilities across agents by assuming that u i (M ) = 1 for all i. We refer to a setting with agents, goods, and utility functions as an instance. An allocation is a partition of M into bundles (M 1 , . . . , M n ) such that agent i receives bundle M i . The (utilitarian) social welfare of an allocation M is defined as
The optimal social welfare for an instance I, denoted by OPT(I), is the maximum social welfare over all allocations for this instance.
A property P is a function that maps every instance I to a (possibly empty) set of allocations P (I). Every allocation in P (I) is said to satisfy property P .
We are now ready to define the price of fairness concepts.
Definition 2.1. For any given property P of allocations and any instance, we define the price of P for that instance to be the ratio between the optimal social welfare and the maximum social welfare over allocations satisfying P :
.
The overall price of P is then defined as the supremum price of fairness across all instances. Similarly, the strong price of P for a given instance is the ratio between the optimal social welfare and the minimum social welfare over allocations satisfying P :
The overall strong price of P is then defined as the supremum price of fairness across all instances.
We will only consider properties P such that P (I) is nonempty for every instance I, so the (strong) price of fairness is always well-defined. With the exception of Theorem 3.7, we will be interested in the price of fairness as a function of n, and assume that m can be arbitrary.
Next, we define the fairness properties that we consider. The first two properties are relaxations of the classical envyfreeness notion.
Definition 2.2 (EF1). An allocation is said to satisfy envyfreeness up to one good (EF1) if for every pair of agents i, i ′ , there exists a set 
It is clear that EFX imposes a stronger requirement than EF1. An EF1 allocation always exists [Lipton et al., 2004] , while for EFX the existence question is still unresolved [Caragiannis et al., 2016] . As such, we will only consider EFX in the case of two agents, for which existence is guaranteed [Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018] .
The round-robin algorithm, which we describe below, always computes an EF1 allocation (see, e.g., [Caragiannis et al., 2016] ).
Definition 2.4 (RR). The round-robin algorithm works by arranging the agents in some arbitrary order, and letting the next agent in the order choose her favorite good from the remaining goods. 4 An allocation is said to satisfy round-robin (RR) if it is the result of applying the algorithm with some ordering of the agents.
Our next property is balancedness, which means that the goods are as spread out among the agents as possible. Balancedness and similar cardinality constraints have been considered in recent work [Biswas and Barman, 2018] . In addition to satisfying EF1, an allocation produced by the roundrobin algorithm is also balanced.
Definition 2.5 (BAL). An allocation is said to be balanced (BAL) if |M i − M j | ≤ 1 for any i, j.
Next, we define a number of welfare maximizers. Definition 2.6 (MNW). The Nash welfare of an allocation is defined as i∈N u i (M i ). An allocation is said to be a maximum Nash welfare (MNW) allocation if it has the maximum Nash welfare among all allocations.
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Definition 2.7 (MEW). The egalitarian welfare of an allocation is defined as min i∈N u i (M i ). An allocation is said to be a maximum egalitarian welfare (MEW) allocation if it has the maximum egalitarian welfare among all allocations.
Definition 2.8 (LEX). An allocation is said to be leximin (LEX) if it maximizes the lowest utility (i.e., the egalitarian welfare), and, among all such allocations, maximizes the second lowest utility, and so on.
Finally, we define Pareto optimality. While this is an efficiency notion rather than a fairness notion, we also consider it as it is a fundamental property in the context of resource allocation.
Definition 2.9 (PO). Given an allocation
for all i with at least one strict inequality. An allocation is Pareto optimal (PO) if it does not admit a Pareto improvement.
Caragiannis et al. [2016] showed that a MNW allocation always satisfies EF1 and Pareto optimality. It is clear from the definition that any leximin allocation is Pareto optimal and maximizes egalitarian welfare.
The problem of computing a MEW allocation has been studied by Bezáková and Dani [2005] and Bansal and Sviridenko [2006] . Leximin allocations were studied by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [2004] and shown to be applicable in practice by Kurokawa et al. [2015] .
Envy-Freeness
In this section, we consider envy-freeness relaxations and the round-robin algorithm, which always produces an EF1 allocation. We begin with a lower bound on the price of EF1.
Proof. Let m = n, r = ⌊ √ n⌋, and assume that the utilities are as follows:
• For i = 1, . . . , r − 1: u i ((i − 1)r + j) = 1 r for j = 1, . . . , r, and u i (j) = 0 otherwise.
• u r (j) = 1 n−r(r−1) for j = r(r − 1) + 1, . . . , n, and u r (j) = 0 otherwise.
• For i = r + 1, . . . , n: u i (j) = 1 n for all j. Consider the allocation that assigns goods ir−r+1, . . . , ir to agent i for i = 1, . . . , r − 1 and the remaining goods to agent r. The social welfare of this allocation is r. On the other hand, in any EF1 allocation, each of the agents i = r + 1, . . . , n must receive at least one good-otherwise some agent would receive at least two goods and agent i would envy her. This means that the social welfare is at most r · 1 r + (n − r) · 1 n < 2. Hence the price of EF1 is at least
For two agents, we establish an almost tight bound on the price of EF1 and a tight bound on the price of EFX. Theorem 3.2. For n = 2, the price of EF1 is at least 
Proof. Lower bound:
Let m = 3 and 0 < ǫ < 1/6, and assume that the utilities are as follows:
The optimal social welfare is 4/3 − 2ǫ, achieved by assigning the first good to agent 1 and the last two goods to agent 2. However, in any EF1 allocation the last two goods cannot both be given to agent 2. Hence the social welfare of an EF1 allocation is at most (1/3 − 2ǫ) + (1/3 + ǫ) + 1/2 = 7/6 − ǫ.
Taking ǫ → 0, we find that the price of EF1 is at least
Upper bound: Consider an arbitrary instance. Sort the goods so that
; goods x such that u 2 (x) = 0 are put at the front and those with u 1 (x) = 0 at the back, with arbitrary tie-breaking within each group of goods. (Goods that yield zero value to both agents can be safely ignored since they have no effect on the optimal welfare or the maximum welfare of an EF1 allocation.) For ease of notation, for any 1 ≤ k ≤ m we write L(k) := {1, . . . , k} and R(k) := {k, . . . , m}. We also define L(0) = R(m + 1) = ∅.
Let
It is easy to see that s < m. If s = 0, both agents have identical valuations and the price of EF1 is 1, so we may assume that s > 0. The allocation S = (S 1 , S 2 ) is an optimal allocation, and the optimal social welfare is u 1 (S 1 ) + u 2 (S 2 ). Without loss of generality, assume that u 1 (S 1 ) ≤ u 2 (S 2 ). Note that we must have u 2 (S 2 ) ≥ 1 2 , since otherwise both u 1 (S 1 ) and u 2 (S 2 ) are smaller than 1 2 and switching S 1 and S 2 would yield a higher social welfare. We can further assume that u 1 (S 1 ) < 1 2 , because otherwise S is also an EF1 allocation and the price of fairness is 1.
Next, we describe how to obtain a particular EF1 allocation F . Let f be the smallest index such that f ≥ s and u 1 (L(f )) ≥ u 1 (R(f + 2)). Clearly, f < m. In the allocation F = (F 1 , F 2 ), we assign the goods F 1 := L(f ) to agent 1, and F 2 := R(f + 1) to agent 2.
Allocation F satisfies EF1. The EF1 condition is satisfied for agent 1, because
For agent 2, since f is the smallest index such that f ≥ s and
If f = s, then F coincides with the optimal allocation S, and u 2 (F 2 ) = u 2 (S 2 ) ≥ 1 2 . Clearly EF1 is satisfied. Else, f > s, and we have 0 < u 1 (L(f − 1)) < u 1 (R(f + 1)). Note also that u 2 (R(f + 1)) > 0. Therefore,
where we take a fraction to be infinite if it has denominator 0.
(None of the fractions can have both numerator and denominator 0.) This implies that
Thus,
implying that EF1 is again satisfied.
The price of EF1 for this instance is at most
. Now we analyze the social welfare of the allocation F and compare it to the optimal social welfare.
If f = s, the price of EF1 is 1. Assume from now on that f > s. We have
Therefore the ratio between the optimal social welfare and the social welfare of F is
We further analyze the last expression. First, taking its partial derivative with respect to u 2 (S 2 ) gives
which is always positive when u 1 (S 1 ) < 1 2 . This shows that the last expression is monotone increasing in u 2 (S 2 ). Thus
Finally, this expression is maximized when u 1 (S 1 ) = 2 − √ 3 and yields a value of
, completing the proof.
Theorem 3.3. For n = 2, the price of EFX is 3/2.
Proof. Lower bound: Let m = 3 and 0 < ǫ < 1/2, and assume that the utilities are as follows:
The optimal social welfare is 3/2−ǫ, achieved by assigning the first two goods to agent 1 and the last good to agent 2. On the other hand, in any EFX allocation, no agent can get both of the goods that they positively value. Hence, the social welfare of an EFX allocation is at most 1. Taking ǫ → 0, we find that the price of EFX is at least 3/2.
Upper bound: Consider an arbitrary instance. If in an optimal allocation both agents get utility at least 1/2, this allocation is also envy-free and hence EFX, so the price of EFX is 1. Otherwise, the maximum welfare is at most 1 + 1/2 = 3/2. Now we show that there always exists an EFX allocation with social welfare at least 1; this immediately yields the desired bound.
Let the first agent partition the goods into two bundles such that her values for the bundles are as equal as possible. Denote by x and 1 − x the values of the two bundles, where
Suppose that all goods of zero value, if any, are in the second bundle. Let y ≥ 1 − y be the corresponding values for the second agent, and assume without loss of generality that y ≥ x. Consider the partition of the first agent, and assume that the two bundles yield value z and 1 − z to the second agent, respectively. If z ≤ 1 − z, by assigning the first bundle to the first agent and the second bundle to the second agent, we have an envy-free allocation with welfare at least 1. Else, z ≥ 1 − z. By definition of y, we also have z ≥ y ≥ x. We assign the first bundle to the second agent and the second bundle to the first agent. The second agent is clearly envy-free. If the first agent still has envy after removing some good i from the first bundle, then by moving good i to the second bundle, we create a more equal partition, a contradiction. Hence the allocation is EFX to the first agent. The social welfare of this allocation is z + (1 − x) ≥ 1.
Next, we give a simple instance showing that EF1 and EFX allocations can have arbitrarily bad welfare. Theorem 3.4. The strong price of EF1 is ∞. For n = 2, the strong price of EFX is ∞.
Proof. Let m = n, and assume that u i (i) = 1 for all i and u i (j) = 0 otherwise. The allocation that assigns good i to agent i for every i has social welfare n. On the other hand, the allocation that assigns good i − 1 to agent i for i = 2, . . . , n and good n to agent 1 is EF1 and EFX, but has social welfare 0. The conclusion follows.
We now turn our attention to the round-robin algorithm. We show that it is always possible to order the agents to obtain a welfare of 1. Proof. We claim that if we choose the ordering of the agents uniformly at random, the expected social welfare is at least 1. The desired bound immediately follows from this claim.
To prove the claim, consider an arbitrary agent i, and assume without loss of generality that
Note that if the agent is ranked jth in the ordering, her utility is at least
Hence, the agent's expected utility is at least
It follows from linearity of expectation that the expected social welfare is at least n · 1 n = 1, as claimed. The tightness of the bound follows from the instance where every agent has utility 1 for the same good.
Lemma 3.5 yields a linear price of fairness for round-robin.
Theorem 3.6. The price of round-robin is n. Consequently, the price of EF1 is at most n.
Proof. Upper bound:
Consider an arbitrary instance. Since every agent receives utility at most 1, the optimal social welfare is at most n. On the other hand, by Lemma 3.5, there exists an ordering of the agents such that the round-robin algorithm yields welfare at least 1. Hence the price of roundrobin is at most n.
Lower bound: Let m = x n for some large x that is divisible by n, and assume that the utilities are such that for each agent i, u i (j) = 1/x i for j = 1, . . . , x i and u i (j) = 0 otherwise. Consider the allocation that assigns goods 1, . . . , x to agent 1, and x i−1 + 1, . . . , x i to agent i for every i ≥ 2. In this allocation, agent 1 gets utility 1, while each remaining agent gets utility (
The social welfare is therefore n − (n − 1)/x. This converges to n for large x.
On the other hand, consider the round-robin algorithm with an arbitrary ordering of the agents, and assume without loss of generality that agents always break ties in favor of goods with lower numbers. Hence, regardless of the ordering, the goods get chosen in the order 1, 2, . . . , m. As a result, every agent gets exactly 1/n of their valued goods, so her utility is 1/n, and the social welfare is 1. Hence the price of roundrobin is n.
The argument for the lower bound in Theorem 3.6 works even if we can choose a new ordering of the agents in every round. This means that the fixed order is not a barrier to obtaining a better price of fairness, but rather the "each agent picks exactly once in every round" aspect of the algorithm.
One may notice that the lower bound construction uses an exponential number of goods. This is in fact necessary to obtain an instance with a high price of round-robin. As we show next, the Ω( √ n) lower bound on the price of EF1 is almost tight as long as m is not too large compared to n. Theorem 3.7. The price of round-robin is O( √ n log(mn)).
Consequently, the price of EF1 is O( √ n log(mn)).
Proof. Consider any instance I. We claim that there exists an ordering for which the round-robin algorithm produces an allocation with social welfare at least
. First, observe that if OPT(I) ≤ 65 √ n log 2 (mn), then Lemma 3.5 immediately yields the desired claim. Henceforth, we will only focus on the case where OPT(I) > 65 √ n log 2 (mn). Fix an optimal allocation M = (M 1 , . . . , M n ), and let
However, since agent i values each item in M r i at most
√ n, which is no more than OPT(I)/65. Hence,
Thus, it suffices to show the existence of an ordering such that round-robin produces an allocation with social welfare at least SW ℓ * (M)/ √ n. Observe that (1) implies that SW ℓ * (M) > 32 √ n. We now consider two cases, based on T := |M
Case 1: T > 2n. In this case, we will show that the roundrobin algorithm with arbitrary ordering yields an allocation with social welfare at least SW ℓ * (M)/ √ n. To see this, let us consider the round-robin procedure with arbitrary ordering, and consider the set of goods that are picked in the first t := ⌊T /(2n)⌋ rounds; let S t ⊆ M denote this set. Now, observe that
This implies that
Since u i (M ℓ * i \S t ) ≤ 1, there must be more than 8 √ n agents such that M ℓ * i S t . Let N * denote the set of such agents.
We claim that, in each of the first t rounds, every agent i ∈ N * must receive an item she values at least 2 −ℓ * −1 . The reason is that agent i picks her favorite good, which she must value at least as much as the good(s) left unpicked in M ℓ * i \S t . Moreover, she values the latter at least 2 −ℓ * −1 , so this must also be a lower bound of her utility for the former.
From the claim in the previous paragraph, we can conclude that the social welfare of the allocation produced is at least
Note that we use the assumption T > 2n to conclude that t ≥ T /(4n) in the first inequality above.
Case 2: T ≤ 2n. In this case, we will show that if we choose the ordering π in a careful manner, then the social welfare obtained in the first round alone already suffices.
Similarly to Case 1, observe that since
there are more than 8 √ n agents i whose M ℓ * i is non-empty. Let N * denote the set of such agents. We will construct the ordering π step-by-step as follows. For k = 1, . . . , ⌈4 √ n⌉, we let π(k) be any agent i such that (1) i is not yet in the ordering and (2) not all goods in M ℓ * i are already picked by π(1), . . . , π(k − 1). Note that such an agent exists because, at each step k, at most two candidate agents become invalid: the agent i = π(k), and the agent i ′ whose good in M ℓ * i ′ is picked by π(k). Since we start with 8 √ n valid candidates, even after ⌈4 √ n⌉ − 1 steps, there are still valid candidate agents to be chosen from.
The remainder of the ordering can be chosen arbitrarily. We now argue that the resulting round-robin allocation has the desired social welfare. To see this, for k = 1, . . . , ⌈4 √ n⌉, observe that agent π(k) must pick a good that is worth at least 2 −ℓ * −1 to her in the first round, since not all goods in M ℓ * π(k) have been picked. As a result, the social welfare is at least
where the first inequality follows from T ≤ 2n.
While Theorem 3.7 shows that the price of EF1 is close to Θ( √ n) unless the number of goods is huge, if we are only interested in the dependence on the number of agents, the gap still remains between Ω( √ n) and O(n). In fact,
Caragiannis et al. [2012] left exactly the same gap on the price of envy-freeness for divisible goods. In Section 7, we exhibit an interesting connection between the indivisible and divisible goods settings by showing that the price of EF1 for indivisible goods is always at least the price of envy-freeness for divisible goods. This implies that improving the O(n) upper bound on the price of EF1 would also yield a corresponding improvement on the price of envy-freeness. We end this section by establishing an exact bound on the strong price of round-robin. Theorem 3.8. The strong price of round-robin is n 2 .
Consider an arbitrary instance. Since every agent receives utility at most 1, the optimal social welfare is at most n. On the other hand, in the round-robin algorithm, the first agent gets to choose an item ahead of all other agents in every round and therefore does not envy any other agent in the resulting allocation. This implies that her utility, and hence the social welfare, is at least 1/n. It follows that the strong price of round-robin is at most n 2 .
Lower bound: Let m be a large number divisible by n, and assume that the utilities are as follows:
• u 1 (i) = 1 m for all i.
• For i = 2, . . . , n: u i (i − 1) = 1, and u i (j) = 0 otherwise.
Consider the allocation that assigns good i − 1 to agent i for every i = 2, . . . , n, and the remaining goods to agent 1. In this allocation, every agent i ≥ 2 receives utility 1. Agent 1 receives utility m−n+1 m , which converges to 1 for large m. Therefore the social welfare converges to n.
On the other hand, consider the round-robin algorithm with the ordering of the agents 1, . . . , n, and assume without loss of generality that agents always break ties in favor of goods with lower numbers. The first agent gets utility exactly 1/n, while the remaining agents get zero utility since their only valuable good is "stolen" by the agent before them in the first round. Hence the social welfare is 1/n. This means that the strong price of round-robin is n 2 , as desired.
Balancedness
In this section, we consider balancedness. We begin by establishing an asymptotically tight bound on the price of balancedness.
Theorem 4.1. The price of balancedness is Θ( √ n).
Proof. Lower bound:
Consider the instance in Theorem 3.1. The social welfare can be as high as r = ⌊ √ n⌋, while a similar argument shows that the social welfare of any balanced allocation is at most 2. The conclusion follows.
Upper bound: We claim that for any instance I, the maximum social welfare of a balanced allocation is always within a factor 4 √ n of the optimal social welfare; this claim implies the desired upper bound. If OPT(I) ≤ 4 √ n, the claim follows immediately from Lemma 3.5. We therefore assume that OPT(I) > 4 √ n. We will show that there is a balanced allocation M such that SW(M) ≥ OPT(I)− √ n 2 √ n ; this suffices for our claim because
. We consider two cases.
Case 1: m ≥ n. Fix an optimal allocation, and let A be the set of agents who receive at least m √ n goods in the optimal allocation, and B the complement set of agents. Since there are at most √ n agents in A, they contribute at most √ n to OPT(I), so the agents in B contribute at least OPT(I)− √ n. We let each agent in B keep her m 2n most valuable goods (or all of her goods, if she has fewer than this number of goods). This yields a total utility of at least
due to the assumption m ≥ n, the remaining goods can be reallocated to obtain a balanced allocation, which has social welfare at least
Case 2: m < n. Fix an optimal allocation, and let A be the set of agents who receive at least √ n goods in the optimal allocation, and B the complement set of agents. Since there are at most √ n agents in A, they contribute at most √ n to OPT(I), so the agents in B contribute at least OPT(I)− √ n. We let each agent in B keep her most valuable good (if she receives at least one good). This yields a total utility of at least
. The remaining goods can be reallocated to obtain a balanced allocation, which has social welfare at least
For two agents, we give an exact bound on the welfare that can be lost due to imposing balancedness.
Theorem 4.2. For n = 2, the price of balancedness is 4/3.
Let m be a large even number, and assume that the utilities are as follows:
• u 1 (1) = 1 and u 1 (i) = 0 otherwise.
• u 2 (i) = 1 m for all i. Consider the allocation that assigns the first good to the first agent and the remaining goods to the second agent. The social welfare is 1 + (1 − 1/m), which converges to 2 for large m. On the other hand, in any balanced allocation, the first agent gets utility at most 1 while the second agent gets utility Upper bound: Consider an arbitrary instance. If m is odd, we may add a dummy good that yields zero utility to both agents-this does not change the optimal social welfare or the maximum social welfare of a balanced allocation. We may therefore assume that m is even.
Sort the goods so that u 1 (1) − u 2 (1) ≥ u 1 (2) − u 2 (2) ≥ · · · ≥ u 1 (m) − u 2 (m). Let s be the last good such that u 1 (s) − u 2 (s) ≥ 0, and assume without loss of generality that s ≥ m/2. An optimal allocation assigns the set of goods S 1 = {1, . . . , s} to the first agent and the complement set S 2 to the second agent, yielding social welfare u 1 (S 1 ) + u 2 (S 2 ) = u 1 (S 1 ) + (1 − u 2 (S 1 )) = 1 + ∆, where ∆ := u 1 (S 1 ) − u 2 (S 1 ) ≥ 0. On the other hand, consider the balanced allocation that assigns goods 1, . . . , m/2 to the first agent and the remaining goods to the second agent. Note that at most half of the goods in S 1 are reallocated to the second agent, and these are the goods with the lowest difference in utility between the two agents. Hence, the utility loss going from the first to the second allocation is at most ∆/2, implying that the social welfare of the second allocation is at least 1 + ∆ 2 . The price of balancedness is therefore at most
This ratio is increasing in ∆ and reaches the maximum at ∆ = 1, where its value is 4/3, completing the proof.
Finally, the same construction as in Theorem 3.4 shows that balanced allocations can have arbitrarily bad welfare. In this section, we consider allocations that maximize different measures of welfare. To start with, we show that every MNW and leximin allocation yields a decent welfare. Lemma 5.1. For any instance, every MNW allocation and every leximin allocation has social welfare at least 1, and both bounds are tight.
Proof. We first establish the bound for MNW. Consider any MNW allocation where agent i receives bundle M i , and assume for contradiction that
. Construct a directed graph with vertices 1, 2, . . . , n, and add an edge from i to j if
Since every vertex has at least one outgoing edge, the graph consists of a directed cycle. For every edge i → j in the cycle, we give M j to agent i instead of agent j. If we consider the change in the multiset of the n utilities between the old and new allocations, at least one number increases while others remain the same. This means that either we have decreased the number of agents who get zero utility, or keep this number fixed and increase the product of utilities of the agents who get nonzero utility. Either case contradicts the definition of an MNW allocation.
To show the bound for leximin, we apply the same argument. An improvement in the multiset of utilities as described in the last step contradicts the definition of leximin.
Finally, the tightness of the bounds follows from the instance where every agent has utility 1 for the same good.
Lemma 5.1 allows us to show that the price of MNW and the strong price of MNW are both of linear order. Similar techniques can be used for the price of MEW and both prices of leximin, as we establish in the two subsequent theorems. Theorem 5.2. The price of MNW and the strong price of MNW are Θ(n).
Proof. It suffices to show that the price of MNW is Ω(n) and the strong price of MNW is O(n).
Lower bound: Let m = n and 0 < ǫ < 1, and assume that the utilities are as follows:
• u 1 (1) = 1 and u 1 (j) = 0 otherwise.
• For i = 2, . . . , n: u i (i − 1) = 1 − ǫ, u i (i) = ǫ, and u i (j) = 0 otherwise.
Consider the allocation that assigns good i − 1 to agent i for i = 2, . . . , n, and good n to agent 1. The social welfare of this allocation is (n − 1)(1 − ǫ). On the other hand, the unique MNW allocation assigns good i to agent i for every i. The social welfare of this allocation is 1 + (n − 1)ǫ. Taking ǫ → 0, we find that the price of MNW is Ω(n).
Upper bound: Consider an arbitrary instance. Since every agent receives utility at most 1, the optimal social welfare is at most n. On the other hand, by Lemma 5.1, the social welfare of any MNW allocation is at least 1. The conclusion follows.
Theorem 5.3. The price of MEW is Θ(n).
Proof. Lower bound: Consider the instance in Theorem 5.2. For ǫ → 0, the social welfare of the optimal allocation approaches n − 1, while the social welfare of the unique MEW allocation approaches 1.
Upper bound: First, we claim that for any instance, there exists a MEW allocation with social welfare at least 1. To prove this claim, we apply the same argument as in Lemma 5.1, but starting with a MEW allocation with maximum social welfare. An improvement in the multiset of utilities as described in the argument does not decrease the egalitarian welfare and strictly increases the social welfare, which gives us the desired contradiction.
Combined with the observation that the optimal social welfare is at most n in any instance, this claim immediately yields the desired upper bound. Proof. Since all leximin allocations have the same social welfare for any given instance, it suffices to show the statement for the price of leximin.
Lower bound: Consider the instance in Theorem 5.2. For ǫ → 0, the social welfare of the optimal allocation approaches n−1, while the social welfare of the unique leximin allocation approaches 1.
Upper bound: Consider an arbitrary instance. Since every agent receives utility at most 1, the optimal social welfare is at most n. On the other hand, by Lemma 5.1, the social welfare of any leximin allocation is at least 1. The conclusion follows.
Surprisingly, MEW allocations can be arbitrarily bad when there are at least three agents.
Theorem 5.5. For n > 2, the strong price of MEW is infinite.
Proof. Let m = n, and assume that the utilities are as follows:
• For i = 2, . . . , n: u i (i − 1) = 1 and u i (j) = 0 otherwise.
Observe that in any allocation, some agent does not get a desired good. This means that every allocation has egalitarian welfare 0, and all allocations are MEW. Now, there exists an allocation with social welfare 0, for example the allocation that assigns good i + 1 to agent i for i = 1, . . . , n − 1, and assigns good 1 to agent n. Since there also exists an allocation with positive social welfare, the strong price of MEW is infinite.
We now turn to the case of two agents. For MNW, we establish almost tight bounds on both prices of fairness.
Theorem 5.6. For n = 2, the price of MNW and the strong price of MNW are at least 27/23 ≈ 1.174 and at most 5/4 = 1.25.
Proof. It suffices to show that the price of MNW is at least 27/23 and the strong price of MNW is at most 5/4.
Lower bound: Let m = 3 and 0 < ǫ < 1/7, and assume that the utilities are as follows:
• u 1 (1) = 2/3, u 1 (2) = 1/3, u 1 (3) = 0.
• u 2 (1) = 4/7 − ǫ, u 2 (2) = 1/7 + ǫ, u 2 (3) = 2/7.
The optimal social welfare is 9/7, obtained by assigning the first two goods to the first agent and the last good to the second agent. On the other hand, one can check that the maximum Nash welfare is 2/7 + 2ǫ/3, obtained (uniquely) by assigning the first good to the first agent and the last two goods to the second agent. This allocation yields social welfare 23/21 + ǫ. Taking ǫ → 0, we find that the price of MNW is at least 27/23.
Upper bound: Consider an arbritrary instance. Suppose that the optimal social welfare is x. If x ≤ 5/4, then Lemma 5.1 immediately implies that the price of MNW of this instance is at most 5/4.
We now focus on the case where x ≥ 5/4. Let us assume further that, in an optimal allocation, the first agent has utility x 1 and the second has utility x 2 , where x 1 ≥ x 2 and x 1 + x 2 = x. Since x 1 ≤ 1, we have
Next, consider any MNW allocation. Suppose that in this allocation the first agent has utility y 1 and the second has utility y 2 . Since the Nash welfare of this allocation must be at least that of the optimal allocation, we have y 1 y 2 ≥ x 1 x 2 . As a result, the social welfare of this allocation is y 1 + y 2 ≥ 2 √ y 1 y 2 ≥ 2 √ x 1 x 2 , where the first inequality follows from
Thus, the price of MNW of this instance is at most
where the inequality follows from 1 ≤ x 1 /x 2 ≤ 4.
Finally, we derive the exact bound for MEW and leximin with two agents. Note that since all leximin allocations are MEW, Theorem 5.7 immediately implies Theorem 5.8. Theorem 5.7. For n = 2, the price of MEW and the strong price of MEW are 3/2.
Proof. It suffices to show that the price of MEW is at least 3/2 and the strong price of MEW is at most 3/2.
Lower bound: Let m = 3 and 0 < ǫ < 1/2, and assume that the utilities are as follows:
• u 1 (1) = 1/2, u 1 (2) = 1/2 − ǫ, u 1 (3) = ǫ.
• u 2 (1) = 1/2, u 2 (2) = ǫ, u 2 (3) = 1/2 − ǫ.
The optimal social welfare is 3/2 − 2ǫ, obtained by assigning the first two goods to the first agent and the last good to the second agent. On the other hand, the maximum egalitarian welfare is 1/2, which can be obtained only by assigning the first good to one agent and the remaining two goods to the other agent. This allocation has social welfare 1. Taking ǫ → 0, we find that the price of MEW is at least 3/2.
Upper bound: Consider an arbitrary instance, and denote by x the maximum egalitarian welfare. The optimal social welfare is at most 1+x, and the social welfare of any MEW allocation is at least 2x. Consider any MEW allocation, and suppose that agent 1 receives utility x and agent 2 receives utility y ≥ x. In the allocation where the bundles of the two agents are swapped, the utilities are 1 − x and 1 − y ≤ 1 − x. Since x is the maximum egalitarian welfare, we have x ≥ 1 − y, or x + y ≥ 1. This means that the social welfare of the original allocation is at least 1, so the social welfare of any MEW allocation is at least max{2x, 1}.
The strong price of MEW is therefore at most 
Pareto Optimality
In this section, we consider Pareto optimality. Since any allocation that maximizes social welfare is necessarily Pareto optimal, the price of Pareto optimality is trivially 1. By establishing a tight lower bound on the welfare of a Pareto optimal allocation, we show that the strong price of Pareto optimality is quadratic. Our result indicates that while Pareto optimality is sometimes referred to as 'efficiency', it does not necessarily fare well if efficiency is measured in terms of social welfare.
Lemma 6.1. For any instance, every Pareto optimal allocation has social welfare at least 1/n, and this bound is tight.
Proof. To establish the bound, it suffices to show that in any Pareto optimal allocation, some agent receives utility at least 1/n. Suppose that this is not the case. Since the utility of each agent for the entire set of goods is 1, every agent envies at least one other agent. This implies that the envy graph, which has the n agents as its vertices and in which there is a directed edge from one agent to another if the former agent envies the latter, contains a directed cycle. By giving agent j's bundle to agent i for every edge i → j in the cycle, we obtain a Pareto improvement, a contradiction.
The tightness of the bound follows from the instance in Theorem 6.2.
Theorem 6.2. The strong price of Pareto optimality is Θ(n 2 ).
Proof. Upper bound:
Consider an arbitrary instance. Since every agent receives utility at most 1, the optimal social welfare is at most n. On the other hand, by Lemma 6.1, every Pareto optimal allocation has social welfare at least 1/n. The conclusion follows.
Lower bound: Assume that n ≥ 2. Let m = n, 0 < ǫ < 1/n, and assume that the utilities are as follows:
• u 1 (1) = 1 n + ǫ and u 1 (j) = 1 n − ǫ n−1 otherwise.
Consider the allocation that assigns good i − 1 to agent i for i = 2, . . . , n, and good n to agent 1. The welfare of this allocation is (n − 1)(1 − ǫ)
On the other hand, the allocation that assigns good i to agent i for i = 1, . . . , n is Pareto optimal. This is because in any Pareto improvement, agent 1 must receive good 1, and it follows that agent i must receive good i for every i. The social welfare of this allocation is 1 n + ǫ + (n − 1)ǫ = 1 n + nǫ. Taking ǫ → 0 yields the desired result.
We also show an exact bound for the case of two agents.
Theorem 6.3. For n = 2, the strong price of Pareto optimality is 3.
Proof. The instance in Theorem 6.2 shows that the strong price of Pareto optimality is at least 3. To show that this is tight, consider an arbitrary instance and an optimal allocation in this instance. Assume that the two agents receive utility x and y in this allocation, where x ≥ y. In any Pareto optimal allocation, at least one agent must receive utility at least y; otherwise the optimal allocation is a Pareto improvement. In combination with Lemma 6.1, this implies that the social welfare of every Pareto optimal allocation is at least max{y, 1/2}.
The strong price of Pareto optimality is therefore at most 
Relating Indivisible and Divisible Goods
In this section, we establish a relationship between the price of EF1 for indivisible goods and the price of envy-freeness (henceforth EF) for divisible goods. Our main result is the following:
Theorem 7.1. For every number of agents n, the price of
EF1 (for indivisible goods) is no less than the price of EF (for divisible goods).
The intuition for this result is that we can partition a divisible good into infinitesimally small pieces of indivisible goods. The key point here is that (1) the optimal allocation remains the same, and (2) EF1 allocations in the new instance correspond to EF allocations in the old instance, since the possible one-good offset has negligible value for each agent.
Preliminaries for Divisible Goods
To formally argue about the price of envy-freeness for divisible goods, we first give precise definitions for the divisible goods setting. Here we adopt the conventions from the cakecutting literature (see, e.g., ).
A cake is defined as the interval [0, 1] . A piece of cake is a union of countable 6 disjoint intervals; let Σ denote the set of all pieces of cake. A valuation function v is a function that maps each element of Σ to a non-negative real number such that
• (Null empty set) v(∅) = 0;
• (Countably additive) For every sequence of disjoint intervals {I i } i∈N , we have v( i∈N I i ) = i∈N v(I i );
That is, ([0, 1], Σ, v) is a probability measure, and furthermore satisfies divisibility. These assumptions are standard and widely used in cake-cutting settings. For every number of agents n, an allocation A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ) is a tuple of n disjoint pieces of cake whose union is the whole cake. An instance is a tuple of n valuation functions v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ), each corresponding to the valuation function of an agent in N = {1, . . . , n}. We say that an allocation A is envy-free (EF) for instance v if
The price of EF of an instance v, denoted by PoEF(v), is the ratio between the maximum 7 social welfare of an arbitrary allocation and the maximum social welfare of an EF allocation. The price of EF for n agents, denoted by PoEF n , is the supremum of the price of EF among all instances.
Given an instance v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) and an allocation A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ), we define the valuation matrix
For a given instance v, a valuation matrix and its corresponding allocation are essentially synonymous; hence, we may use the previously defined notions of envy-freeness and social welfare for the valuation matrices as well.
For an instance v, denote by M v the set of valuation matrices M v A over all possible allocations A. The following wellknown theorem from the cake-cutting literature will be useful for us. Dubins and Spanier, 1961; Dvoretzky et al., 1951] 
is simply the intersection of M v and 6 In some prior works, each piece of cake is defined as a union of finite disjoint intervals. We remark that Theorem 7.1 still holds under this definition. Specifically, if we letM v denote the set of valuation matrices defined under this (finite) definition, then M v (defined under our countable notion) is simply the closure ofM v . The result for the finite definition follows from this observation.the set of all "EF valuation matrices" 
A Useful Lemma
In this section, we will provide a lemma crucial to the proof of Theorem 7.1. Informally speaking, the lemma states that, as δ → 0, the welfare of an optimal δ-EF allocation is no larger than that of an optimal EF allocation. To make this formal, let us define additional notation: for an instance v, let MaxSW EF (v) (resp. MaxSW δ-EF (v)) denote the maximum social welfare of an EF allocation (resp. δ-EF allocation) of v. We can now state and prove the lemma:
Proof. Let {δ k } k∈N be any sequence of positive real numbers such that
Hence, it suffices to show that
. For every k ∈ N, let M k denote the valuation matrix of a δ k -EF allocation with maximum social welfare for v. Consider the sequence {M k } k∈N . This is a sequence in a compact set M v . Hence, it contains a subsequence {M k ℓ } ℓ∈N (where 
We now prove (i) and ( -EF . In other words, we have β ≤ δ k ℓ 0 . Since this is true for every ℓ 0 ∈ N and lim ℓ→∞ δ k ℓ = 0, we must have β = 0, meaning that M * is envy-free.
Finally, we argue that (ii) holds. Since M * = lim ℓ→∞ M k ℓ , we have (M * ) ij = lim ℓ→∞ (M k ℓ ) ij for all i, j ∈ N . It follows that
which concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 7.1
We now proceed to prove our main theorem of this section (Theorem 7.1).
Proof of Theorem 7.1. Fix the number of agents n. To prove the lemma, it suffices to show that for every ǫ ∈ (0, 1], the price of EF1 is at least the price of EF times 1 − ǫ. Fix ǫ > 0. Recall that PoEF n is defined as sup v PoEF(v). Thus, there exists an instance v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) such that PoEF(v) ≥ (1 − ǫ/2) · PoEF n . This means that it suffices to show that the price of EF1 is at least (1 − ǫ/2) · PoEF(v). Indeed, this will imply that the price of EF1 is bounded below by (1 − ǫ/2) 2 · PoEF n ≥ (1 − ǫ) · PoEF n . To show this, we will create an instance I such that the price of EF1 of I is at least (1 − ǫ/2) · PoEF(v). Before we describe I, we need a few additional definitions:
• Let δ > 0 be such that MaxSW δ-EF (v) ≤ MaxSW EF (v) + ǫ/4. This δ exists due to Lemma 7.4.
• Let A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ) denote an optimal allocation for instance v. Recall that each A i is a countable union of intervals; this means that there exists a finite union of Our instance I contains q − 1 indivisible items. For each j = 1, . . . , q − 1, good j is constructed so that it is equivalent to the piece [s j , s j+1 ] in the cake, i.e., u i (j) = v i ([s j , s j+1 ]) for every agent i. We now show that the price of EF1 of I is at least (1 − ǫ/2) · PoEF(v).
We start by proving that OPT(I) ≥ OPT(v) − ǫ/4. The reason is simple: we can allocate all intervals inÃ i to each i because their endpoints are in {s 1 , . . . , s q }. (The remaining goods can be assigned arbitrarily.) This allocation yields social welfare at least
Next, we argue that any EF1 allocation of I has social welfare at most MaxSW EF (v) + ǫ/4. To see this, let us consider any EF1 allocation of I. Since we include p i 1 , . . . , p i ⌊1/δ⌋ to the set of endpoints, agent i values each good at most δ. Hence, since the allocation is EF1, each agent i's value for her bundle is at least her value for any other bundle minus δ. In other words, the corresponding allocation of the cake is δ-EF. Hence, the social welfare of the allocation is at most MaxSW δ-EF (v), which is in turn at most MaxSW EF (v) + ǫ/4 from our choice of δ.
As a result, the price of EF1 for I is at least
which concludes our proof. Note here that the first inequality follows from the fact that both OPT(v) and MaxSW EF (v) are always at least 1.
Discussion
In this paper, we study the price of fairness for indivisible goods using several fairness notions that can always be satisfied. For most cases, we exhibit tight or asymptotically tight bounds on the worst-case efficiency loss that can occur due to fairness constraints. Interestingly, both the round-robin and MNW allocations, which are EF1, can have social welfare a linear factor away from the optimum, but not worse. In future research, it would be useful to close the gaps that remain after this work, the most intriguing of which is perhaps the EF1 gap between Ω( √ n) and O(n). As we mentioned, settling this question would also have consequences on the price of envy-freeness gap in the divisible goods setting left open by Caragiannis et al. [2012] .
Another direction for future work is to study the price of fairness for the chore division problem, where chores refer to items that yield negative utility for the agents. Indeed, almost all of the notions that we consider in the goods setting have direct analogs in the chore setting, and it would be interesting to see whether the corresponding bounds in the two settings turn out to be similar as well.
